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Abstract: The paper examines the steady rise of China in the international system vis a vis the 
gradual retreat (looking inwards) of the United States of America as the global hegemon faced with 
enormous strategic uncertainty. Unequivocally, the international system is characterized by an endless 
and relentless struggle for power, hence, the possibility of a power switch between great powers in the 
system. Using library research method, aided by textual analysis of secondary data, the paper 
interrogates the normative changes in China’s foreign policy, from the building of global institutions 
that can rival the post-war II institutions, to the building of burgeoning partnerships with its 
neighbours. It contends that China’s one belt one road initiative is a significant structural strategy to 
advance a new global order, thus; it signals a more assertive China in its foreign policy, from risk 
aversion to risk embracing. The paper concludes that the ‘one belt one road’ initiative if actualized, 
has serious global geopolitical and geo-economics significances as well as a grand ploy to re-edit the 
global order and further Chinese spheres of influence and interest in the international system.  
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1. Introduction  
A glance at the history of the modern international system suggests that there has 
continually existed a constant flux of power between and among leading powers 
and growing powers. This is inevitable because one of the essential characteristics 
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of international politics over time is: The unending and relentless struggle for 
power and relevance among actors in the system. This claim has been substantiated 
by different realist scholars (Morgenthau, 1948; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979; 
Gilpin, 2001; Wohlforth, 2008) who contend that whatever the intentions of states 
in global politics; the goal essentially remains seeking and retaining power.  
The position of a global (hegemonic) power has fluctuated among great powers 
over time in trajectories of history. History has seen the rise and fall of empires and 
great powers, from the Roman Empire to Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria-
Hungary among others. Kennedy (1987) opines that several factors contribute to 
the emergence, demise, and exchange of great powers (hegemonic status) over 
time; from the management of military power to that of economic capabilities 
among others. The control of these fundamental sectors during the time of war or 
the pre-war era, largely determines whether or not a state remains a dominant force 
in international politics. More so, the socio-economic, strategic, technological and 
organizational breakthrough among rising powers, as well as the perfunctory 
mindset of the leading power also contributes to the rise and fall of great powers 
over time.  
When examined against current realities, it is observed that the dominance of the 
U.S. led multilateral world order with its liberal doctrine is beset with enormous 
challenges and thus marching towards its apogee. More so, realities in the post-cold 
war era have encouraged multipolarity, as nations struggle to find their way out of 
inequality, poverty, and underdevelopment. Indeed, the current world order is 
characterised by multiple-centres of power with the emerging economies like 
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and perhaps India exerting significant 
political and economic influences accordingly, creating a complex web of power 
interactions and engagement (Folarin, Ibietan & Chidozie, 2016). More recently, 
given the apparent unpredictability, strategic uncertainty, the retreat of America 
more to itself and lack of belief in international agreements by the new American 
President Donald Trump, the global trust in America’s led World order is in a state 
of global flux, and has also stirred the appetite for alternative structure among 
nations of the world. 
Amidst all this happening, the rising China State has continued to improve on her 
economic and technological breakthrough over the years. This increasing economic 
prowess has focused the beam light of researchers and pundits (like Beeson & 
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Zeng, 2018; Breslin, 2017; Andornino, 2017; Vangeli, 2017) on the place and 
impact of China in the global political-economic system. These economic 
capabilities have also transcended into other spheres shaping China’s foreign 
policy in recent time; with its grand tact - the one belt and one road initiative, 
which may perhaps provide the alternative structures sought by many nations.  
This Chinese led socio-political and economic initiative which envisage to connect 
China’s ports to those of Asia, Europe, Middle East, Africa and the Eurasia regions 
covers areas that create around 55 percent of the world’s Gross National Product 
(GNP), 70 percent of the global population and 75 percent of the world’s energy 
reserves. With an expected financial commitment from China to total 1.4 trillion 
dollars in the coming years; Beijing has officially dedicated around 300 billion 
dollars for infrastructural loans and trade financing, a sum which incorporates a 40 
billion dollars committed to the Silk Road Fund for infrastructural development 
and the 100 billion dollars preliminary capital allotted to the Chinese Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Casarini, 2016, p. 96).  
The repercussion of this grand strategy if actualised is enormous, especially 
regarding the current liberal world order.  In this light, the work becomes 
significant as it interrogates China’s quest to fill the lacuna created by America’s 
systemic retreat. Using the power transition framework, the work advances 
alternative theoretical perspective for comprehending the politics of China’s 
foreign policy in recent time.  Fundamentally it does so by interrogating China’s 
Belt and Road initiative and its likely structural implication on current world order.  
1.1. Method and Structure 
The work draws from a large pool of secondary sources of data including relevant 
books, journals, periodicals, reviews, and internet materials. These data were 
analysed using textual method. The work is divided into 5 sections; the first 
introduces the paper, while the second section embodies the conceptual and 
theoretical framework for the study. Basically, the section revisits the contested 
idea of unipolarity, global governance, hegemony and approximates the power 
transition model to the study. The third examines the normative changes in China’s 
foreign policy in a principally liberal world order. The fourth explores the 
significance and implications of the Belt and road initiative on the current world 
order, while the fifth concludes the study. 
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2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
2.1. The Concept of Unipolarity 
Unipolarity simply connotes a system in which a single nation controls a 
disproportionate percentage of the politically relevant resources of the system. 
Unipolarity suggests that the sole super-power faces no ideological contending 
opponent of equivalent status or impact, and even if ideological options do exist, 
they do not pose a danger to the unipolar power's position as a model for others 
(Gautam, 2014, p. 35). Ikenberry, Mastanduno & Wohlforth (2009) aver that the 
unipolarity threshold value is to be attained by powerful states that are viewed in 
the international system as a polar actor. Hence, unipolarity is assumed when there 
is no form of counter-hegemonic alliance that can off stage the polar actor.  
In comprehending the term unipolarity it is germane to refer to the customary 
definition of the term ‘pole'.  A pole can be regarded as a state that contains 
capabilities and capacities that unequivocally distinct it when compared with all 
other nations in the international system. Furthermore, the ‘polar actor’ is a nation 
that enjoys appreciable level of resources or opportunities to accomplish its 
objectives; surpasses other nations in all components of state capacity characterized 
as, the demographic, territory, natural endowments, economic capabilities and 
military capacities, in addition to organizational-institutional competence (Waltz, 
1979, p. 131). Consequently, Unipolarity is a construct which is too great to be 
counterbalanced by an alliance because of the pole’s capabilities. 
The concept of unipolarity has been enriched by the realist school in international 
relations, with the “poles” considered the most important player and actor in the 
international system. The “pole actor” is “one state or coalition of states, which is 
so important, that his leaving or entering into the system will change the 
architectural structure of the international system itself” (Tarifa, 2010, p. 48). He 
further argues that a power pole is determined in the international system by having 
technological, economic, military and political power. Thus, this leads the pole in 
providing public goods to the rest of the states in the international society in terms 
of security, technology and economic wise. The capabilities of the polar actor will 
lead to alliances of weaker states either to constrain it or to exploit it because the 
pole is endowed with all the components of power; land size, competence, 
demographic, military, economic, human endowment and capacities (Waltz, 1979). 
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Therefore, unipolarity is the ability of a dominant power, with global reach, 
capable of doing whatever it pleases to do either in support or against the 
international system anywhere in the world to advance its foreign policy goal.  
2.2. The Concept of Global Governance  
 Before exploring the concept global governance, it is important to examine what 
the term governance means. As a concept, governance has been used to imply a set 
of complex process and structure in private and public spheres of life. Governance 
is regarded as the ‘range of formal and informal values, rules, norms, practices, and 
organizations that provide better order than if we relied purely upon formal 
regulations and structures’ (Weiss, 2013, p. 31). Viewed from a global perspective, 
Chidozie and Aje (2017, p. 48) suggests that governance ‘features a fine interplay 
between, the States, profit organizations, non-profit organizations, inter-
governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and the individuals’ 
that are inextricable in the management of the ubiquitous challenges of humanity. 
Simply put, it is a comprehensive, dynamic, multifaceted process of interactive 
decision-making that is continuously evolving and responding to changing 
situations (Governance, Commission on Global, 1995, p. 4).  
In Finkelstein (1995, p. 369) words, global governance as a reflection of doing 
what governments does at home in the international context.  Essentially, global 
governance embraces a wider range and seemingly ever-growing actors 
(international institutions, States, individuals,) in every domain. This aligns with 
the Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance conceptualization 
which posits Global governance as ‘comprising relationship of transnational actors 
with the domestic, local and sub-national actor. It involves a combination of treaty-
based, informal multilateral and bilateral relations between nations progressively 
more influenced by non-state actors actions and desires’ (Commission on Global 
Security, Justice and Governance, 2015, pp. 8-9). For instance, the United Nations 
(UN) system has no central government (authority) and single commissioner. It 
constitutes a loose network of organizations 
Additionally, a working and conceptual challenges of global governance are 
enormous. This informs Weiss (2010, p. 808) argument that “global governance 
should perhaps be seen as a heuristic device to capture and describe the confusing 
and seemingly ever-accelerating transformation of the international system” and a 
concept to reflex the reality that undoubtedly, there has never been a global 
government, and there will never be such. Furthermore, global governance pertains 
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to the interplay of ‘myriad shared or individual entities’ arising from several social 
and specialised orientations, “which form networks that engage to address issues 
that threaten local and global communities” (Jang, McSparren & Rashchupkina, 
2015, p. 1). Global governance is concerned with issues in which a single state 
cannot address alone because of the complexity and dynamics of the problems in 
the international system. Thus, global governance involves various dimensions of 
interactions between different actors-formal and informal in the international 
system chatting a clear path for humanity. 
2.3. The Concept of Hegemony  
Hegemony is a complex concept that lacks conventional definition and means 
different things to various people. Strange (1987) notes that ‘they are a bundle of 
concepts and explanations centring on the notion of the role of the hegemon or 
leader, the dominant state in the international system, and the connection between 
the hegemon and the stability of that system' (cited in Mowle & Sacko, 2007, p.7). 
The term hegemony has been synonymous with the idea of the dominance of one 
group over another. 
The concept was developed by Antoni Gramsci (1971) which has helped to deepen 
our knowledge on the dynamism of power relations and interactions between and 
among nations in the global society (system). The term hegemony is derived from 
the Greek expression “hegemonia”, which connotes leadership. It was used to 
describe an asymmetrical power relation. Gramsci (1971) posits that coercion or 
force does not drive power solely, but power also thrives on consent. He conceives 
hegemony as the leading position by a dominate state among others states and its 
unchallenged leadership role in the international system through the promotion and 
universalisation of its core national interests as the interest of each tendency. He 
further asserts that hegemony is the representation of the status of the most 
dominant nation in its engagement in the global system or the position of a 
powerful nation in a particular region. Nye (2002) argues that for a superpower to 
be regarded as a hegemonic power the country must be able to persuade others 
states to cooperate. Persuasion could be achieved by using soft and hard power in 
compelling other countries to believe in a mutual interest.  
Similarly, Volgy, Kanthak, Fraizer & Ingersoll (2005, pp. 1-2) see hegemony as 
having the power, capability and position to amend the rules and norms of global 
systems centred on one’s own interest and activities. Hence, the power to influence 
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global happenings by any country in line with its blueprint and doing otherwise 
would be an illusion. Strange (1989, p. 165) avowed that hegemony essentially 
needs two kinds of strengths; relational and structural based.  Relational power is 
the ability to force and persuade other plays and actors whereas structural power 
encapsulates the ability to achieve the desired rules and operations in the 
international system. She further proposes four features of structural power which 
she calls hegemony’s global position; 
 security element, consisting of the use of arms to deter or defend other 
countries security; 
 production element, consisting of the control of the production of goods 
and services globally; 
 financial element, consisting of the control of the finance and credit 
international capital market; and 
 Knowledge element, consisting of the capability to initial development, 
accumulation of wealth and capital and the transfer of technology.  
(Strange, 1987) 
According to Keohane (1984), for a country to be regarded as a hegemonic power 
in the world political economy, the country must control large markets, capital, 
have access to important raw materials for production and must have a comparative 
advantage in goods with high value added. Hence, it must be stronger than any 
state holistically in all ramifications. Moreover, hegemony is a situation in which 
single-handedly one state dominates the rules and arrangement of the 
preponderance of power either regionally or internationally. Therefore, for 
hegemony to be created, power is required simultaneously in all facets such as 
economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural sectors, hence this will 
stimulate the challenging power into making a normative and structural change in 
economic, political, military, diplomatic and cultural sectors. 
2.4. Theoretical Framework 
The choice of theory for this work is the power transition theory. We adopt the 
power transition theory because of its lasting applicability to the power transitional 
effect, changing power relations and “probabilistic tool by which to measure these 
changes and it allows forecasting of likely events in future rounds of change” 
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(Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2011, p. 1). The power transition approach is an off-
shoot of the realist theory in the field of international relations. The theory emerged 
from the writings of Organski (1958) and further advanced by Organski and Kugler 
(1980). 
However, it has some variations from the basic assumptions of the realist political 
theory. The power transition theory contrasts with the realist theory with the 
argument that the international system is hierarchically arranged and not 
anarchical. It is hierarchically arranged with the dominant state at the top of the 
hierarchy in the international system, dictating the rules of engagement in the 
global system. States in the global system could either be satisfied or dissatisfied 
with the distribution of power. The satisfied states in the international system tend 
to support the dominant power in maintaining the status quo, while dissatisfied 
states perhaps a rising power alone or an alliance of rising powers challenge the 
dominant power. 
It agrees with the realist assumption that power is a very important variable in 
moulding how the global order works. The power transition theory posits that 
power is reflected in the convergence between economics and politics. Economic 
wealth reflects the potentiality for power, which can be allotted to security and 
other crucial sectors. Power includes demographic strength and productivity 
(Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2011). Power transition theorists assume that 
international competition is motivated by what a country gets either from 
cooperation or conflict. The goal of every state in the international system is to 
utilise the net gains of power, as countries analyse what they stand to gain from 
cooperation or conflict. Conflict emerges if the gains from cooperating are less. 
Consequently, the rules guiding international and domestic politics are akin 
together with the fact that there is no central law guiding the international system, 
thus, the internal growth [economic, military, and technological] of a state 
determines its power in the international system. In effect, nations in the 
international system are in competition of the scares resources, and if the gap 
between the dominant state and the next is smaller, the more chances a conflict will 
arise (Organski & Kugler, 1980). Therefore, every action that a state takes in the 
global system is either to maintain, support or challenge the power distribution 
status quo. 
Thus, China’s structural arrangement and initiative can be theoretically understood 
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using the power transition approach to international politics. Hence, as a 
framework, it seeks to provide insight into the unfolding trajectories in the 
international system. 
 
3. China’s Normative Changes in a Liberal World Order  
Since the outcome of World War II, the arrangement put in place through the 
Bretton Woods conference of 1944, the San-Francisco conference of 1945, and the 
ever-evolving rafter of institutions constitute the foundations of the international 
rules-based system. With the underlying assumptions that America emerged in the 
post-war as the superpower unchallenged, then challenged by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republic (USSR). The collapse of USSR and the Berlin wall signalled the 
end of the cold war and ushered the world into an era of unipolarity and the global 
hegemony of the United States of America, which Fukuyama tags ‘the end of 
history'. However, with the development of several emerging economies and 
multipolarity, the world has witnessed China’s steady rise and challenge to the 
current international order marshalled by America and her allies. China’s 
continuous strives to outperform the United States reigning hegemon, particularly 
in the economic sector, continues to resonate in international debates. This was the 
submission of a scholar: 
China’s rise affects the United States because of what IR scholars call the 
“power transition” effect. Throughout the history of the modern international 
states system, ascending powers have always challenged the position of the 
dominant (hegemonic) power in the international system—and these challenges 
have usually culminated in war (Layne, 2008, p. 16) 
In the same vein, an ascending China is likely to prove no exception. It has 
increased its economic diplomacy in the international system with its neighbours. 
Before the year 2000, United States of America had occupied the biggest trading 
pattern of virtually every state in Southeast and Eastern Asia, a role currently 
occupied by China. This strategy is seen as a way of balancing America's 
dominance in the region. Since a superior nation like China cannot be left out from 
the most important regional trading blocs in her region, America’s overall trade 
and growth rates may decline in the course of time as regional trading blocs which 
increase trade, economic growth and development for associates while guiding 
trade away from non-associates is emphasised in the region (Pape, 2005). China 
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has been encouraging free trade pacts with its neighbouring states of Southeast 
Asian and others states in the international system. This is reflected in China’s 
determination in building up a Free Trade Area with the regional bloc Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Within the FTA framework, Beijing 
presents an alternative market to Europe and North America, in addition to other 
platforms for members to grow, thus “the FTA arrangement with ASEAN helps 
Beijing support its long-term interests in mitigating, if not countering, US influence 
in Asia” (Ba, 2003, p. 641).  
Likewise, China has also improved the relationships with African countries and 
providing economic assistance with no conditionality in contrast with western 
countries and multilateral institutions that attaches heavy terms to Aids. 
Furthermore, the China that acts outside what the west considers as the noble way 
of doing politics, constitute a real threat to the global order with its assertiveness in 
its foreign policy. China is constructively modernising its army and military 
capabilities. The acquisition of sophisticated naval, air force and missile 
capabilities by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is geared towards protecting 
China’s interest in Taiwan and the Southern China Sea. Wang (2010) averred that 
‘Beijing has intensified efforts to procure the military capabilities to deter Taiwan 
from declaring de jure independence and to counter US efforts to assist Taiwan 
should conflict erupt’ (Wang, 2010, p. 559). The naval forces in China are 
increasing hard power capabilities to protect the ever-increasing China's global 
interest around the world, but the PLA’s revolution and transformation will 
possibly take quite a while. But in managing America’s military power in the 
immediate time and to cope with Beijing’s technological inadequacies, Chinese 
armed forces have resulted in unsymmetrical warfare (Lee, 2008). This includes 
warfare in cyber and counter space systems against civilian and military networks, 
as well as asymmetric warfare on information operations, financial infrastructure, 
psychological, legal and media (Wang, 2010). Also, more recently, China has 
contributed more in terms of funding to the United Nations and peacekeeping 
mission than any other member of the United Nations Security Council, including 
the permanent five (P5) members, with the military, medical, police and 
engineering troops serving in various missions. Indeed, this demonstrates China’s 
readiness and enthusiasm in taking up the responsibility of providing governance in 
the area of global security and in providing public goods (Zhang, 2016). 
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Consequently, the future of US-China relations will witness a progressively rising 
influential China, and a strategic uncertain United States, engaged in a grand 
conflict over the rules, principles and headship of the global system (Ikenberry, 
2008).  
Prior to the mid-1990s, China perceived doubt in multilateral organisations because 
it expected that other nations could utilize them to join forces against China. China 
had perceived nearly all global institution, for example, as advancing America's 
interests. With Beijing favouring bilateral agreements, believing that China's 
geographical and demographical size would give it more advantage. Nonetheless, 
by 1996, rising China understood that multilateral engagements could help enhance 
the growing concerns over its power. Participating in the global institutions would 
empower Beijing to restructure their guiding doctrines to better propel its interests. 
As China became progressively surer of its hard and soft power, it viewed the gains 
of global institutions and structure as mechanisms of statecraft. Such a perception 
of international organisations is essentially diverse from accepted laid down 
principle and norms (Goldstein, 2005).  
China’s utilization of multilateral institution aligns with the view that ‘international 
institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests' (Waltz, 
2000, p. 21). But with its participation in these institutions, China thought it will 
have a more significant voice. Unfortunately, this was not actualised, thus 
prompting China to design its own multilateral agencies. The creation of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was viewed a counter move in giving 
China’s voice in supranational organisations which was lacking in the present 
multilateral organisation structures, and fill the gap not filled by the current 
multilateral organisations (Enright, Scott & Associates, 2016). The AIIB was 
launched in 2016 with 57 country members with an initial capitalisation of 100 
billion dollars with a commitment of 50 billion dollars from China.  In a similar 
fashion, the BRICS Development Bank was transformed into the New 
Development Bank which has Brazil, Russia, India, China and later joined by 
South Africa (BRICS) as the founders. These countries account for about 25 
percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and over 40 percent of the 
world’s population. 
Apart from the multilateral institutions, Beijing is promoting new bilateral relations 
while also maintaining the ones it had earlier. Through effective partnership 
arrangements, China looks to expand its spheres of influence by connecting 
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financial and economic gains with bilateral relations, two-sided relations. The idea 
of partnership is available to potential allies, and it is within the framework of these 
partnerships that China seeks to guide and balance US power, without directly 
confronting the United States of America. China has built partnerships and 
cooperation like: China–Africa Cooperation, Central, East and Southeast Europe 
(CESEE), Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
more recently, China’s structural strategy, the One Belt One Road initiative, which 
highlights China’s new global role of linking its domestic development into its 
global orientation: a strong practical and normative link (Huang, 2016).  
 
4. One Belt One Road as a Structural Change to the Liberal World 
Order  
There is no doubt that China is in a phase of greater domestic transition that will 
definitely reflect in its external relations; with the quintessential example of the 
entrenchment of Xi’s ideology into the communist party constitution at its 19th 
Session, the removal of political term limits for the office of the President amongst 
other.  However, President Xi Jinping has utilized almost all fora over the past five 
years to publicise China's new structural initiative: The One Belt One Road 
initiative, in which the continuous transformation of China (Chinese dream) is the 
focal point of his political program. The initiative consists of two pillar posts, the 
belt, and the road. The former seeks to connect China with Europe, Russia, South 
and Central Asia, while the latter is a proposed maritime route, connecting the 
ports of China with that of Africa, Middle East, Europe, South East Asia and South 
Asia. It is projected to cover 55 percent of the world's Gross National Product 
(GNP), 70 percent of the global population, and 75 percent of the world’s energy 
reserves with an expected financial commitment from China to total 1.4 trillion 
dollars in the coming years. Beijing has officially dedicated around 300 billion 
dollars for infrastructural loans and trade financing, a sum which incorporates a 40 
billion dollars committed to the Silk Road Fund for infrastructural development 
and the 100 billion dollars preliminary capital allotted to the AIIB (Casarini, 2016).  
Therefore, the OBOR is a shift from former President Deng Xiaoping’s renowned 
instruction of China bidding time, laying low and never taking the lead. Thus, the 
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initiative is regarded by scholars as the Chinese Marshall plan in the twenty-first 
century. This is anchored firstly on, strengthening and building up new 
collaboration between the nations on the belt and road, with the objective of 
making systems of cooperation in numerous areas and on wide range of political 
levels, ‘often described as a “community of common destiny” or “community of 
shared interests” in which economic development and cooperative security 
reinforce each other (Jinping, 2013). Secondly, the initiative seeks to be flexible, 
inclusive and open to any member who seeks to participate, as the OBOR is 
progressively perceived to be beneficial for countries and people around the globe, 
but the geographic coverage is not determined and remains vague. Thirdly, it 
centres on building up a holistic political and economic network of connectivity 
between countries along the belt and road. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping has 
talked about ‘five aspects of connectivity’, namely: policy, trade, road, intellectual, 
and monetary connectivity (Fu & Lou, 2015) with infrastructural development, 
highways, railways, ports, as its core and partnerships with neighbouring countries 
through six proposed economic corridors which include:  
 New Eurasia land bridge, stretching from Western China province to western 
Russia; 
 China-Mongolia-Russia corridor, stretching from Northern China province to 
Eastern Russia; 
 China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor, stretching from Western China 
province to Turkey; 
 China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India corridor, stretching from Southern China 
province to Myanmar; 
 China-Indochina peninsula corridor, stretching from Southern China province to 
Singapore; 
 China-Pakistan corridor, stretching from south-Western China province  to 
Pakistan. 
Geo-economically, the initiative will facilitate the internationalising of China's 
currency, as nations along the belt and road will conduct trade with the Yuan, and 
these countries may use China’s currency as reserves in their respective central 
banks. Hence, in essence, cross-border trade settlement is likely to grow in the 
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Yuan, with flows of Chinese investment most likely to be in US dollars (Summers, 
2016). Also, it will facilitate alternative investment markets, free markets for the 
Chinese goods and services, as well as developing the western hinterlands of China 
which is more underdeveloped when compared with the eastern parts which have 
greater access to the ports, thus creating a more integrated region. Moreover, China 
currently is associated with globalization. China has defended the global project, 
thus becoming indispensable on an expanding array of international issues, from 
economic governance to climate change with alternatives source of energy, low 
carbon emission and promotion of a green environment. For instance, the Paris 
accord on climate change. 
Geopolitically, the withdrawal of America from the Trans-pacific partnership 
agreement signals a vacuum. In this context, the Belt and Road project is strategic 
because it affords China the opportunity to control their immediate region (Asia) 
and also avails them the opportunity to move to West, North Africa. This will 
possibly improve China’s relations with Europe. The OBOR depends as much on 
its capacity to empower a plurality of political communities across Eurasia and its 
African neighbourhood through open-ended, mutually beneficial arrangements, as 
it does on its being perceived as part of a global effort toward what has so far 
proved an elusive quest for a new ethical, institutional and social order. Similarly, 
China is projecting the OBOR as a catalyst for a new ‘vision of global governance' 
and national strategy. The initiative is anticipated to be an important driver for 
China’s short and long-term objectives, desires, initiatives, and a crucial pillar of 
its “going global’ strategy. Russia has also signalled a cautious acceptance of the 
initiative. Thus, the initiative will expand China's spheres of influence to traditional 
Russia spheres of influence and further westward into turkey and Europe. Russia 
acceptance is borne out of its western sanctions and economic crisis which has left 
it with very few power partners. Clarke, et al., (2017, p. 69) asserts that: 
By linking BRI to its own regional initiative— the Eurasian Economic Union—
Moscow hopes to stake a claim to partial ownership of the idea and largely 
preserve its regional influence while avoiding conflict with Beijing and direct 
responsibility for the practicalities of implementing BRI in Central Asia. 
However, this initiative has a lot of security concerns with China’s regional 
neighbours as well as politically unstable countries as partners –Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and other nations in the Middle East. Yet, others have presented China 
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as an alternative leader to the global leadership of the United States of America due 
to China’s desire to transform its growing economic and strategic supremacy into 
the OBOR (Fukuyama, 2016). China will benefit from OBOR as it will guide 
global economic development and contribute to the principles of economic 
governance, in a manner that affects the process of globalization by presenting 
concepts that diverge from hegemonic market neoliberalism. Thus, this strategic 
initiative is a clarion call by China on the international community to work jointly 
towards a “harmonious and inclusive” world, an idea proposed in 2005 by former 
President Hu Jintao. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Undeniably, there is a significant difference between United States of America and 
China on what the rule-based order of the international system should be. The two 
states vary on certain fundamental issues, such as non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states, sovereignty, economic integration, and the environment. Although, 
China has embedded itself into the America liberal international order to fast track 
its economic development and growth. It is transforming economic wealth into soft 
and hard power that dares America’s geopolitical dominance, and most importantly 
working within the post-1945 international order system to transform itself and the 
global order. Thus, it is building some new structural foundations of an 
international order through its brainchild organisations like the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization and BRICS, and more recently through the one belt one 
road initiative as a paragon in constructing an alternative to the international order.  
China is using the simple maxim in international relations that posits that once a 
country has economic power in the international system, it can, in turn, translate 
into political power, which then engenders security power through acquiring 
military capabilities which generates foreign policy power and finally generates 
strategic power. Thus, a progressively rising China will challenge the US within 
and outside the global order, while making a lot of structural changes to usurp the 
existing order and building a China-driven global order.   
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